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INTRODUCTION
Winn Newman*
This issue of the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform addresses the much maligned and oft-misunderstood doctrine of "comparable worth." "Comparable worth" (or pay equity) is merely a popular name for the well-established concept
that sex- or race-based wage discrimination is illegal. As the following articles demonstrate, proponents of the so-called "comparable worth" doctrine do not argue that employers are required
to pay women's and minorities' jobs according to their intrinsic
"worth." Rather, proponents assert-and the courts agree-that
wage disparities between male and female jobs, or between minority and nonminority jobs, having their genesis in discrimination are unlawful and must be eliminated. Moreover, at least in
some cases, one such indicator of unlawful wage discrimination
is a pattern of disparate pay between male and female classifications, which the employer itself has determined possess
equivalent or identical components of skill, effort, and responsibility. Where these patterns occur in a work force segregated
along race or sex lines, the inference that discrimination was a
factor in setting these disparate wage rates seems inescapable.
Thus described, the basic position of the proponents of measures for ending wage discrimination would seem to be both uncontroversial and unassailable. Nonetheless, objections to these
efforts abound. Opponents chiefly raise five arguments, which I
will discuss briefly.
First, some opponents of pay equity initiatives take a "blame
the victim" approach. They maintain that women (or minorities)
working in job classifications with unlawfully depressed wage
rates should seek relief from wage discrimination by securing
other jobs. Clearly this argument is woefully lacking in both law
and logic. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 specifically
bans discrimination in compensation, as well as a variety of
other discriminatory employment practices. Remedies under Ti* Senior Partner, Newman & Owens, Washington, D.C. Mr. Newman has litigated
numerous sex- and race-based wage discrimination cases around the country, beginning
in the 1960's. He is currently lead counsel in a number of sex discrimination suits.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
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tie VII have been carefully tailored by the courts to redress specific discriminatory practices and to "make whole" the victims of
such unlawful discrimination. Nothing in the language of Title
VII itself, its legislative history, or the numerous court decisions
interpreting it suggests that a different rule applies with respect
to remedies applied for wage discrimination.
Second, opponents argue that elimination of wage discrimination is too costly. This argument, however, was resolved by Congress when it enacted Title VII's prohibitions against wage and
other forms of discrimination. Congress recognized that some
costs would be the inevitable by-product of ending discrimination, but Congress made the basic policy decision that the societal and individual costs of maintaining discrimination in the
work force far outweighed the costs to employers of eliminating
it. In short, cost is simply no defense to discrimination.
Third, some opponents raise the "apples and oranges" argument. They assert that it is impossible to compare dissimilar
jobs to determine their respective components of skill, effort,
and responsibility. However, this argument completely ignores
the long history of employer reliance on job evaluation as the
principal mechanism for comparing and determining the relative
values of jobs within a given workplace. Indeed, it has only been
since plaintiffs began to use job evaluation offensively, in the
wage discrimination arena, that employers have attempted to retreat from their own reliance on job evaluation as a sound mechanism for measuring jobs.
Fourth, opponents raise the spectre of "disrupting the market" as an argument against ending wage discrimination. They
contend that wages within individual workplaces are set on the
basis of "market rates" and that implementation of pay equity
or comparable worth initiatives to end wage discrimination
within that workplace necessarily constitutes impermissible interference with the "market." The opponents' market argument
partakes of an entirely simplistic, and often unsupportable, interpretation of "market rates" as a mechanism for setting wages.
Moreover, it ignores the fact that historically the government
has interfered with "the market" in numerous ways-e.g., minimum wage and overtime laws and the Equal Pay Act-and that
Congress has regularly mandated such interference where essential to securing other broad public policy objectives. No less is
appropriate in the context of eliminating wage discrimination.
Finally, opponents argue that workers' campaigns to end wage
discrimination will result in the establishment of governmental
wage-setting bureaucracies. This argument mischaracterizes the
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very particularized nature of wage discrimination lawsuits, as
well as the mechanisms for implementing necessary wage adjustments. Ending wage discrimination manifestly does not mandate
the establishment of national wage scales; to the contrary, all it
requires is that individual employers address their own compensation practices to determine whether, and the extent to which,
they discriminate on prohibited bases. Where such discrimination exists, it should be remedied, consistent with the individual
employer's overall compensation and classification scheme.
The articles in this Symposium discuss in depth many of these
and other arguments that have been presented in the wage discrimination debate. In so doing, they clarify the issue of wage
discrimination and resolve some of the confusion engendered by
this debate. Three of the articles, those by Carin Clauss, Ruth
Blumrosen, and Nancy Gertner, discuss the role litigation plays
in ending wage discrimination. Analysis of wage discrimination
litigation is important because vigorous enforcement of Title VII
is one mechanism for securing various objectives of the broaderbased pay equity movement.
Carin Clauss discusses one theory of proving Title VII wage
discrimination suits. 2 Relying on experiences in Wisconsin and
elsewhere, Clauss describes the manner in which an employer's
paradigmatic model for assessing male (or nonminority) jobs
may be applied to female (or minority) jobs to determine
whether standards have been applied disparately. Where application of the "male model" to female jobs reveals apparent sexlinked disparities in pay, Clauss argues that a standard Title VII
disparate treatment case has been shown. Clauss cautions, however, that litigation alone will not be enough to achieve pay equity goals. She predicts that legislative initiatives in the pay equity area will become necessary, due to politics and lower courts'
reluctance to embrace fully Title VIl's prohibitions against wage
discrimination.
Ruth Blumrosen's article 3 postulates that a principal barrier
to successful wage discrimination litigation has been the belief of
some courts that they lack the expertise to formulate appropriate remedies for wage discrimination. The reluctance of courts in
this regard is often articulated as a fear that remedial orders on
their part necessarily will result in wage-setting bureaucracies or
bankrupt employers. Blumrosen attempts to lay these concerns
2. Clauss, Comparable Worth-The Theory, Its Legal Foundation, and the Feasibility of Implementation, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 7 (1986).
3. Blumrosen, Remedies for Wage Discrimination, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 99 (1986).
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to rest. By analyzing litigation and studies, she identifies three
typical patterns of wage discrimination and proposes practical
remedies, premised on the employers' own assessment of jobs
within their work force, which may be implemented without becoming enmeshed in economic theory. Professor Blumrosen estimates that these remedies will typically cost between one and
four percent of an employer's payroll.•
As an experienced Title VII litigator, Nancy Gertner is aware
of the difficulties of using Title VII to achieve the goals of the
pay equity movement. Some of the problems Gertner addresses
are those of proof of "either discriminatory animus or a discriminatory mechanism"& as the cause of wage differentials, and of
remedy when an employer does not have an identifiable mechanism to set wages. Due to the difficulties inherent in wage discrimination litigation, as well as the time and expense of any
litigation, Gertner argues for the development of organizational
strategies to use in conjunction with litigation. She particularly
stresses that any such organizational strategy should focus on
unions because of their recognized status as participants in the
marketplace and their power to affect wages.
One theoretical and one practical discussion of comparable
worth round out this Symposium. George Johnson and Gary Solon use economic theory to analyze the possible long-run impact
of a comparable worth law on the economy. 6 They predict that
comparable worth legislation would transfer income between
women, from those who do not have jobs affected by comparable
worth to those who do, rather than from male to female workers.
Nina Rothchild, unlike Johnson and Solon, does not address the
abstract, macroeconomic effects of comparable worth, but rather
explains how one employer, the State of Minnesota, implemented it and discusses its results to date. 7 Contrary to the predictions of its opponents, comparable worth for Minnesota employees has not been prohibitively expensive, nor has it resulted
in employee layoffs, a transfer of income among employees, or a
new enforcement bureaucracy. To the contrary, Rothchild attributes to this successful statewide implementation the recent
enactment of additional legislation requiring municipalities in
4. Id. at 152 & n.154.
5. Gertner, Thoughts on Comparable Worth Litigation and Organizational Strategies, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 163, 169 (1986).
6. Johnson & Solon, The Attainment of Pay Equity Between the Sexes by Legal
Means: An Economic Analysis, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 183 (1986).
7. Rothchild, Pay Equity-The Minnesota Experience, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 209
(1986).
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Minnesota to apply comparable worth principles m their own
wage-setting practices.
This Symposium helps to explain that "comparable worth" is
merely a euphemism for garden variety discrimination that violates express prohibitions of federal antidiscrimination law and
severely limits job-related opportunities and benefits for women
and minorities. Hopefully, the message of this Symposium will
not be lost on reasonable people: that wage discrimination is unlawful and that our energies must now be turned to developing
effective means for eliminating it.

